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IN THE SUPRF~lE COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UT.Z\H, in the inter-
est of: 
J. c. p.' 
Case No. 15130 
a person under eighteen 
years of age. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is a case in which the Juvenile Court found John 
Payne, a minor, guilty of obstructing a police officer in the 
performance of his duty. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The Juvenile Court found the allegations contained in 
the petition to be true. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks to have this court affirm the verdict 
of the Juvenile Court. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Respondent finds no specific error in the Statement 
of Facts ser. forth in appellant's brief. However, respondent 
feels that the emphasis placed by appellant on certain of 
the facts, and omissions therefrom, gives a distorted impres-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
sion of the true circUIT1stances, and for that reason was 
its own abbreviated statement of the facts as follows: 
On New Year's Eve, December 31, 1976, Officer Willis 
Pidcock, a patrolman for Ogden City, was in uniform and 
on duty. (R. 2) . He was sitting in his patrol car and observe, 
Officer Bowcutt, likewise an Ogden policeman and likewi~e in 
uniform, attempting to impound another vehicle. (R. 2). Of-
ficer Bowcutt was discussing the impound with a Scott Payne. 
A scuffle ensued between Officer Bowcutt and said Scott Payne 
and Officer Bowcutt hollered to Officer Pidcock for assis-
tance. (R. 2). As Officer Pidcock ran to help he observed 
that Officer Bowcutt had hold of the suspect around the shoul· 
ders and back,and the suspect was striking Officer Bowcutt 
in the side and the side of the head. As Officer Pidcock 
entered the fray he was likewise struck three times by the 
suspect. (R. 2). The two officers subdued the suspect and 
were moving with him toward the impound wrecker, when John 
Payne came up from the left side of Officer Pidcock, grabbed 
Officer Pidcock and caused him to release his grasp on the 
suspect' s arm. (R. 3) • Officer Pidcock then shifted his at· 
tention to John Payne, informed John that he was under arrest 
and wrestled him to the ground where he handcuffed the boy. 
(R. 4) . During this time Officer Bowcutt had succeeded in 
handcuffing Scott Payne. Officer Bowcutt then took Scott 
Payne into custody and Officer Pidcock took John into his c~ 
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made the required referral to the Ogden police department, 
and John was subsequently released to his mother. (R. 4). 
On January 21, 1977, John Payne was charged in the 
weber County Juvenile Court as follows: 
"On or about the 31st day of December, 1976, 
John Payne did obstruct justice in that he did, 
with the intent to hinder, prevent or delay the 
apprehension of another for the commission of a 
crime, obstruct by force or intimidation a police 
officer from performing an act which might aid in 
the apprehension of such person." (Tr. 9) 
A hearing was held in the Juvenile Court and on March 2, 1977, 
the Court issued its Findings of Fact and Decree as follows: 
"The allegations contained in the petition 
are found to be as follows: True. The Court finds 
that the crime that was being committed was the as-
sault on Officer Bowcutt by Scott Payne. The Court 
finds that Officer Pidcock did have the right to 
intervene and that John obstructed justice by inter-
fering with him." (Tr. 10) 
The Court ordered the juvenile to pay a fine of $25.00 
or work for a subdivision of government for a total of 12-1/2 
hours. (Tr. 10). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT A 
FINDING THAT THE JUVENILE WAS GUILTY 
OF OBSTRUCTING JUSTICE. 
Appellant alleges that the following finding of 
fact by the Juvenile Court was contrary to the weight of 
the evidence: 
"The court finds that the crime that was 
being committed was the assault of Offic~r Bow~utt 
by Scott Payne. The court finds that Officer Pid-
cock did have the right to intervene and that 
John obstructed justice by interfering with him." (R 10) • 
- 3 -
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Appellant further alleges that "there was no evidence adduce: 
at the hearing that: (1) .•. Officer [Bowcutt] was in the 
lawful performance of his duties; (2) ... [he] was apprehen 
ing another for the commission of a crime; (3) any crime haG 
been committed; (4) ... [he] was acting lawfully." (Appel-
lant's Brief p. 5) 
Although appellant would make much out of the paucity 
of evidence regarding the actions taken by Officer Bowcutt a: 
the fact that neither he (Bowcutt) nor Scott Payne testified 
at the hearing, the question whether "There was • • • suffi-
cient evidence for the court to determine if an assault was 
or was not occurring" (Appellant's Brief, p. 6) against Offi1 
Bowcutt by Scott Payne is largely irrelevant. Practically 
speaking, since Scott Payne was not the defendant below, the 
question is not whether Scott committed an assault upon Offi1 
Bowcutt, but whether the evidence produced in the hearing wa' 
sufficient to support the Juvenile Court's finding that defe: 
ant, John Payne, obstructed justice by interfering with Offi1 
Pidcock. 
It seems obvious that appellant has made a fundamenta. 
error in analyzing the facts and the findings. The Court 
did not find that Scott Payne was assaulting Officer Pidcock 
as stated on page 5 of appellant's brief. Nor was the Juve· 
nile Court's jurisdiction imposed because Scott Payne was 
assaulting Officer Bowcutt as suggested by appellant on page 
of his brief. The finding was that John Payne, the juvenile 
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was interfering with Officer Pidcock, and Juvenile Court 
jurisdiction over John Payne, a juvenile, was predicated on 
the juvenile's acts, not the acts of Scott Payne. John was 
on trial in tre Juvenile Court for his acts in relation to 
Officer Pidcock. Scott was not on trial nor was his relation-
ship with Officer Bowcutt necessarily pertinent, except that 
the scuffle which was taking place furnished justification 
for interference by Officer Pidcock. 
Appellant cites the case of State of Utah v. Richard 
Allen Bradshaw, Utah 541 P. 2d 200 (1975) in support of his 
argument that the commission of a crime must first be estab-
lished before one can be found g~ilty of unlawfully interfer-
ing with an arrest for said crime. (Appellant's brief, Pp.6-7). 
State v. Bradshaw held that th~ provisions of Section 76-8-305, 
"Interference in arrest by law enforcement official," were 
unconstitutional. The juvenile in our instant case was not 
charged under the provisions of Section 76-8-305. He was 
not charged with intentionally interfering with an arrest. 
Appellant seems to feel that whether or not a lawful arrest 
was taking place is dispositive of this case. (Appellant's 
Conclusion, Brief p. 8). Actually, this consideration is 
irrelevant. The juvenile was charged under the provisions 
of Section 76-8-306, obstructing justice, not Section 76-8-305. 
The elements of the "Obstructing" statute require that a person, 
with intent to prevent the apprehension of another for the 
commission of a crime, obstructs by force anyone from per-
forming an act which might aid in the apprehension of such 
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person. In the instant case the Juvenile Court Judge found, 
with ample evidence, that Scott Payne was com.~itting a crime 
against the person of Officer Bowcutt. He further found 
that defendant John Payne was obstructing Officer Pidcock 
in apprehending Scott. Certainly, all the elements of the 
obstructing charge have been met. 
The offense of obstructing justice is set forth 
in Utah Code Annotated §76-8-306: 
"A person is guilty of an offense if, with 
intent to hinder, orevent, or delay the discovery, 
apprehension, prosecution, conviction, or punish-
ment of another for the commission of a crime, he: 
(a) Knowing an offense has been committed, 
conceals it from a magistrate; or 
(b) Harbors or conceals the offender; or 
( c) Provides the offender a weapon, transpor-
tation, disguise, or other means for avoiding dis-
covery or apprehension; or 
(d) Warns such offender of impending discov-
ery or apprehension; or 
(e) Conceals, destroys, or alters any physical 
evidence that might aid in the discovery, apprehen-
sion, or conviction of such person; or 
(f) Obstructs by force, intimidation, or de-
ception anyone from performing an act which might 
aid in the discovery, apprehension, prosecution or 
conviction of such person. 
·(Emphasis added) 
The facts of the instant case demonstrate that the 
defendant, John Payne, did intentionally obstruct Officer 
Pidcock by force from performing an act which might have ail 
in the apprehension of another for the commission of a crime 
As testified to at the hearing, Officer Pidcock was on auey 
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and in uniform at the time of the incident. Since Officer 
Bowcutt was also in uniform and was attempting to perform a 
police function, i.e., impound a vehicle, it would seem that 
the court justifiably presumed that both officers were act-
ing in performance of their duties. From his patrol car across 
the street, Officer Pidcock was able to observe Officer Bowcutt 
and Scott Payne. After the scuffle began, Officer Bowcutt 
called for assistance from Officer Pidcock. Under the cir-
curristances, there can be little doubt that Officer Pidcock was 
justified in coming to the aid of his fellow officer. 
The powers and duties of police officers are described 
in Utah Code Annotated, §10-6-66, as follows: 
"10-6-66. Police officers--Powers and duties.--
All police officers of any city shall possess the pow-
ers conferred upon constables by law. It shall be the 
duty of the police force in any city at all times to 
preserve the public peace, prevent crime, detect and 
arrest offenders, suppress riots, protect persons and 
property, remove nuisances existing in the public 
streets, roads and highways, enforce every law relat-
ing to the suppression of offenses, and perform all 
duties enJoined upon them by ordinance." 
(Emphasis added.) 
In executing the above powers and duties, police officers 
must necessarily assist one another. The hazardous nature of 
police work requires a high degree of teamwork and cooperation--
indeed, the rendering of assistance to a fellow officer would 
appear to be mandatory. The mere possibility that Officer 
Bowcutt may in some way have acted improperly pursuant to an 
impoundment is immaterial absent some egregious and obvious 
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abuse on his part at the time of the incident. Police 
officers must act quickly and rarely have the luxury of 
meditation and certain knowledge. To require proof that 
a prior crime has been committed before an assisting officer 
can be considered to be acting within the scope of his duty 
would undermine trust between police officers and impede 
effective law enforcement. Again, the real question is wheth· 
er defendant obstructed Officer Pidcock in the performance 
of his lawful duty. 
In the case of State v. Hinsley, Utah, 501 P. 2d 111 
(1972) this Court quoted with approval the test for an ob-
struction charge as set out in State v. Sandman, Utah, 286 
P. 2d 1060 (1955). The test is that it must appear that 
(A) a duly constituted public officer, (B) engaged in the 
performance of his official duty, (C) was obstructed or re-
sisted by defendant. In the instant case a duly constituted 
public officer (Officer Pidcock) , engaged in the performance 
of his official duty (assisting a fellow officer in apprehe~ 
ing a suspect) was obstructed by the defendant (interference 
by John Payne). The offense has clearly been established 
and the uncontroverted evidence supports the finding of 
guilt based on this test. That defendant did obstruct Offr 
cer Pidcock while in the performance of his duty is clearly 
supported by Officer Pidcock's testimony: II • John came 
up from my left side and grabbed me, causing me to release 
my grasp on Scott's arm. * * * I turned around not knowing 
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whether he was going to strike a blow at me, or what was 
going to happen at that time." (R. 3) . As stated in 
5g Arn Jur 2d 868, §19: 
"Where a person by words or conduct inter-
feres in behalf of another person who is in----crrffi-
culty with an officer, the offense of obstructing 
an officer will be held committed where either ac-
tual force is used or a threat is made, coupled with 
the present ability and apparent intention to exe-
cute it." (Emphasis added). 
There would appear to be no excuse for John's behavior. He 
knew he was interfering with a police officer in performance 
of his duty; and, it is highly unlikely that his interference 
was anything but intentional. 
While true that "Any unlawful interference with 
the fundamental right of personal liberty may be resisted", 
5 Am Jur 2d 778, it would appear that the right of a third 
person to intervene on behalf of another is quite restricted. 
In State v. Browers, 356 Mo. 1195, 205 S. W. 2d 721 (1947), 
for example, defendant attacked a marshal, after the marshal 
shot at defendant's brother, to prevent him from killing his 
brother. The court held that defendant had acted lawfully 
to prevent an illegal arrest and could use only such force as 
was reasonably necessary to repel an assault on his brother. 
Respondent does not dispute that some circumstances may 
justify third party interference. Justice Henriod stated 
in his concurring opinion to State v. Bradshaw, Utah 541 P. 2d 
BOO (1975): 
- 9 -
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"Consider also, the case where an over-anx-
ious, eager officer obviously is using aggres-
sive force to subdue a teenager to the point 
where bystanders honestly believe he is about 
to kill him, or where a drunken officer with a 
badge is arresting and beating a perfectly in-
nocent citizen, or where a cop at a football 
stadium goes berserk and at the point of a gun 
attempts to arrest everyone in front of him, 
or a game warden, in a remote wilderness area, 
out of sheer suspicion manhandles a hunter 
minding his own business, or an off-duty law 
enforcement officer in civilian clothes, not 
·~ecognized" as a Bobbie, tries to arrest his 
neighbor on a trumped-up charge .. 
(Emphasis added) . 
But note that obstruction by third parties can be justified 
only when the person interfered with is overzealous, acting 
clearly illegally and/or with excessive use of force. The 
instant case contains no such extenuating circumstances. 
To hold obstruction justifiable in other than extreme cases 
could serve only to impede effective law enforcement and 
encourage unwarranted interference with police officers. 
POINT II 
THE JUVEUILE COURT HAD APPROPRIATE JURISDIC-
TION OVER THE RESPONDENT. 
Appellant states that the lower court abused its 
discretion by taking jurisdiction over the subject minor; 
however, if John, a minor, did in fact violate §76-8-306, 
respondent fails to see any reason for improper jurisdictio~. 
under §78-3-16: 
- 10 -
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erred. 
"Jurisdiction of juvenile court--Judge 
may sit as district court judge.--Exceut as other-
wise provided by law, the court shall have exclu-
sive original jurisdiction in proceedings: 
(1) Concerning any child who has violated any 
federal, state, or local law or municipal ordinance, 
or any person under twenty-one years of age who 
has violated any such law or ordinance before becom-
ing eighteen years of age, .regardless of where the 
violation occurred." (Emphasis Added). 
POINT III 
THE FINDINGS OF THE JUVENILE COURT MUST 
BE GIVEN DEFERENCE UNLESS CLEARLY AGAINST 
THE WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE. 
The appellant must clearly show that the lower court 
In the case of State in the Interest of K--B--, 
326 P. 2d 395, 7 Utah 2d 398 (1958), this Court reaffirmed 
the great deference which must be given to findings of 
the trial court. It stated: 
"In approaching appellant's contention that 
the evidence does not justify the order made, it 
is well to have in mind the basic rules applica-
ble to this review. The statute provides that 
appeals from the juvenile court shall be, 'in the 
same manner * * * as * * * appeals from judgments 
***of the district court**.' Hearings in the 
juvenile court involving questions as to the cus-
tody of children are equitable. Due to the ex-
treme concern of courts for the welfare of children, 
proceedings in their interest are sometimes stated 
to be equitable in the highest degree, because the 
most careful consideration will be given such 
matters. In equity proceedings we are charged with 
the responsibility of reviewing the evidence; and 
it is the established rule that we will not disturb 
the findings and determination made unless they 
are clearly against the weight of the evidence, or 
the court has abused its discretion." 
(Emphasis Added) 
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Respondent respectfully submits that the evidence as 
argued under Point I was more than sufficient to support 
the verdict rendered in the trial Court. The only evidence 
was that submitted by the State, which certainly established 
that the juvenile had deliberately and unlawfully obstructed 
the administration of justice. 
CONCLUSION 
Because there were no extenuating circumstances which 
would justify defendant's interference with Officer Pidcock's 
performance of his duty, the Juvenile Court acted properly 
in finding defendant guilty of obstructing justice. Respond· 
ent thus seeks to have the action of the Juvenile Court af-
firmed. 
-12 -
Respectfully submitted, 
Robert B. Hansen 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
Franklyn B. Matheson 
Assistant Attorney Genera 
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